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We estimate forward-looking interest rate reaction functions for the
G3 and some in£ation targeters. Shifts in the conduct of monetary
policy are detected for the USA and Japan. In contrast with the
existing literature, we show that these countries only shifted to policies
consistent with an implicit in£ation-targeting regime in the 1990s.
In£ation targets and central bank reforms in Sweden, the UK, Canada
and New Zealand only led in some cases to changes in policy
responses, and changes in policy pre-date the introduction of targets.
We challenge the one-model-¢ts-all approach towards monetary policy
that permeates much of the current literature.
" Introduction
The importance of institutions has become a central tenet of modern
macroeconomics. This is apparent in the literature on time inconsistency
in monetary policy, which sees the appointment of an independent central
bank and in£ation targeting as key elements in achieving price stability
(Persson and Tabellini, 1997). In this paper we report estimates of
forward-looking interest rate reaction functions for a number of OECD
economies. We demonstrate that signi¢cant changes in monetary policy
behaviour have occurred in a number of OECD economies, but that such
shifts in policy are not necessarily linked with institutional change.
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Our results contrast sharply with those obtained by others (Clarida
et al., 1998, 2000). Whilst con¢rming that central bank policies became
more `conservative' at the beginning of the 1980s (and in£ation expect-
ations followed), we also detect some signi¢cant shifts in the subsequent
conduct of monetary policy in the USA and Japan. In addition, the
introduction of in£ation targeting and central bank reforms in countries
like the UK, Sweden, Canada and New Zealand has not always led to
major changes in the way in which central banks of those countries react
to the objectives of economic policy. Our results suggest that institutional
change either initiated a slow shift in policy or con¢rmed an earlier change
in the policy stance. Our ¢ndings are consistent with the view that changes
in society's attitude towards in£ationöand the ensuing policiesöare
relatively more important than formal institutional arrangements (Posen,
1993; McCallum, 1996).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline the main
contributions and results of the paper. In Section 3, we provide a link
between estimated interest rate reaction functions and the theory of
monetary policy design. This provides the background for our empirical
models. Our empirical estimates are presented in Section 4, and Section 5
concludes.
á The Existing Literature and Key Results
2.1 Context: The Existing Literature
There are several recent contributions on modelling interest rate reaction
functions and we need to distinguish our contribution carefully from those
of previous authors. In general three broadly di¡erent approaches have
been used in modelling monetary policy behaviour. First, a number of
researchers have used vector autoregressions (VARs) to estimate the way
in which policy actions depend on a set of macroeconomic indicators, and
how in turn policy actions are transmitted to key macro variables.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) use the US Federal Funds rate to analyse
the transmission mechanism in the USA. Christiano et al. (1994) and
Bernanke and Mihov (1995, 1997) inter alia1 have re¢ned this approach by
analysing alternative measures of monetary policy and identi¢cation
mechanisms for the estimated VARs. Second, some researchers have
focused on estimating single-equation (structural) reaction functions for
monetary policy instruments (see, for instance, Groeneveld et al., 1996;
Muscatelli and Tirelli, 1996; Clarida and Gertler, 1997; Clarida et al.,
1998, 2000). Third, Rudebusch (1995, 1996) uses data from forward-
1For an excellent survey, see Christiano et al. (1998) who analyse the advantages and pitfalls
of the VAR approach to identifying monetary shocks.
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looking ¢nancial markets to construct measures of unanticipated shocks
to monetary policy.
In this paper we adopt the second of these approaches. The third
approach, which uses ¢nancial market data, can be a useful method to
test whether changes in monetary policy have an impact on in£ation
expectations. But it does not allow one to interpret policy changes in terms
of policy reaction functions and the likely implications for output and
in£ation stabilization. The VAR approach has some advantages in that it
allows one to jointly model both the endogenous policy response and the
transmission mechanism by making only minimal assumptions about the
causal links and the timing of the authorities' reactions to new macro-
economic data. However, the results from VAR models do seem to depend
critically on the assumptions made about which variables to include in
the VAR, and on the existence of a time-invariant transmission mechanism
and reaction function (see Rudebusch, 1996). Given the number of
variables one usually includes in a VAR and the limited number of
observations, it becomes di¤cult to conduct any stability analysis by, say,
using `rolling VARs'. This is especially the case if there have been frequent
changes in either the policy regime or the ¢nancial system which might
a¡ect the timing of the policy response and the nature of the transmission
mechanism.2
Indeed, as noted by Christiano et al. (1998), VAR modellers usually
prefer not to report or to interpret estimated policy rules, because if the
actual policy rule is forward-looking the estimated coe¤cients of such
VAR-estimated `policy rules' will be di¤cult to interpret. Instead, VAR
models are primarily designed to construct measures of monetary policy
shocks for use in analysing the transmission of monetary shocks3 (even
though there are di¡ering views of the robustness and usefulness of the
monetary policy shock measures obtained from VARsösee Rudebusch,
1996; Bagliano and Favero, 1998; Christiano et al., 1998). Overall, it does
seem that VARs are less useful in undertaking an empirical analysis of
regime changes in the conduct of monetary policy.
2.2 Key Results and Value Added
Our focus on single-equation (forward-looking) structural reaction func-
tions is similar to that in Clarida and Gertler (1997) and Clarida et al.
(1998, 2000), and allows us to analyse shifts in monetary policy regimes
using recursive estimation techniques. We extend these earlier studies in
2Although Bernanke and Mihov (1995) do allow for a limited amount of time variation in
their VAR model. For a recent application of Bayesian VAR analysis, see Muscatelli
and Trecroci (2000).
3See for example Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).
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the following ways. First, by presenting recursive estimates of these
reaction functions, we can detect marked changes over the last two
decades in the way monetary policy has been conducted. This allows us to
¢nd some new and surprising results. For instance, the announcement of
explicit in£ation targets and the move to more independent central banks
in several OECD economies has not led to a major contemporaneous
change in the way monetary policy reacts4 to the ¢nal objectives of
economic policy in the 1990s. This has important implications for the large
theoretical literature that has emerged on central bank independence.
Second, unlike Clarida et al., we use alternative methods to estimate
our measures of expected in£ation and potential output. This is based on
the assumption that the private sector is imperfectly informed about the
central bank's preferences, whereas the central bank is imperfectly
informed about the permanent and cyclical components of output growth
(see Blinder, 1998; Orphanides, 1999). Interestingly this also leads to new
results. Whilst the interest rate reaction function for Germany is reason-
ably stable, there seem to be some signs that monetary policy rules in the
USA and Japan are less stable than one might have imagined over the
period 1985^99. Our estimates suggest that US policy has shifted to react
to in£ationary expectations more vigorously, and with a shorter lead. This
¢ts well with most anecdotal accounts of US policy in the 1990s, but is in
sharp contrast with the results of previous empirical studies. Moreover, we
¢nd that the output coe¤cient has the wrong sign in the mid-1980s,
suggesting that real interest rates were too low at a time when the output
gap was positive. Only in the 1990s does the output coe¤cient sign become
positive once more. Our results stand in sharp contrast with those of
Favero and Rovelli (1999), who argue that since 1982 the Fed acted as a
strict in£ation targeter, rejecting the hypothesis that output stabilization is
an independent argument in the loss function of the Fed.5 Japanese policy
4These results are consistent with those obtained in related work by Groeneveld et al.
(1996), who reject the hypothesis of a structural break following the switch to in£ation
targeting in Canada, New Zealand and the UK. However, their models are backward-
looking, use mainly domestic target variables, and focus solely on the overall stability of
the ¢tted reaction functions during the early 1990s. Our modelling approach in this
paper examines the stability of the model parameters over a longer sample and uses a
measure of expected in£ation and of potential output. There are also alternative
approaches in the literature to assess the impact of in£ation targets. For instance,
Freeman and Willis (1995) examine credibility e¡ects on the yield curve, and Almeida
and Goodhart (1996) use a variety of di¡erent methods to assess the impact of in£ation
targeting on the behaviour of monetary authorities.
5They estimate a model of the US economy using a VAR speci¢cation for the output gap,
in£ation and a commodity price index over the period 1960^98. By doing this they
estimate the parameters in the aggregate demand and supply functions. Then they use
generalized method of moments (GMM) methods to estimate, over the period 1983^98,
an interest rate rule which allows the central bank desired trade-o¡ between output and
in£ation to be identi¢ed. Their approach requires full information, rational expectations
and invariance of the structural model to changes of the monetary policy regime.
490 The Manchester School
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 2002.
also seems to have exacerbated the cycle in the late 1980s, and only seems
to have fallen in line with in£ation targeting post-1990. This con¢rms the
suspicion that Japanese policy was inappropriately geared to external
objectives (the relationship with the USA) in the 1980s. A key contribution
of this paper is that we move away from the full-sample rational
expectations hypothesis adopted in Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), which sits
rather uneasily with the `learning under uncertainty' that characterizes
central banks' decision-making (see Blinder, 1998; Woodward, 2000).
Third, our study provides some empirical evidence on the lead with
which the expected in£ation rate enters estimated reaction functions. This
is of considerable interest to theoretical analyses of the trade-o¡ between
output and in£ation variability in monetary policy design (see Haldane
and Batini, 1998; Goodhart, 1999). There is no other empirical study that
we are aware of which compares the forward-lookingness of monetary
policy across OECD countries.6
â Interest Rate Reaction Functions and the Theory of Monetary
Policy Design
In this section we show how a forward-looking interest rate reaction
function can emerge from a simple Barro^Gordon-type theoretical model
of monetary policy design. Consider the following model for current
in£ation in the presence of costly price adjustment as in Calvo (1983) or
Rotemberg (1983) (Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) propose a sticky-
price model which has similar implications):
pt  pt ÿ ptÿ1  bpet1  jyt ÿ y 1
where current in£ation p depends on in£ation expectations and the current
output gap, and y is potential output. The output gap is given by
yt ÿ y  ÿsRt ÿ pet1 ÿ r  et 2
Output deviations from the natural rate depend on a supply shock et and
the deviations of the expected real interest rate from its equilibrium value
r. Following Svensson (1998), suppose that the monetary policymaker's
loss function is given by
L  wpt ÿ p  yt ÿ ~y2  rRt ÿ ERt2  r1Rt ÿ Rtÿ12 3
where the authorities penalize not only deviations of output from an
output target ~y, which exceeds the natural level y, and of in£ation from a
target p (as in Svensson, 1997a), but also penalize deviations and changes
in the policy instrument.
6Although in a later paper Clarida et al. (2000) have considered reaction functions with
di¡erent lead structures.
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This formulation assumes that stabilization policy via interest rate
changes is costly, and that for this reason shocks are never fully stabilized
in the long run. Svensson's model highlights the risk of instability of an
anti-in£ationary policy by assuming that the policymaker penalizes
deviations of Rt from zero. Instead the formulation in (3) assumes that the
policymaker knows the level of in£ationary expectations, and con-
sequently chooses a sequence for Rt. However, in the event of shocks
hitting the economy, the authority decides whether to deviate from the
nominal interest rate implied by the state of in£ationary expectations.
Solving the model under discretion, so that the monetary authority
minimizes (3) with respect to the nominal interest rate, taking expectations
as given, yields an interest rate reaction function
Rt  wr ÿ A  bpet1  cet  dRtÿ1 4
where the coe¤cients are
w  s
2j2w s2
s2j2w s2  r1
b  s
2j2w s2  wbjs
s2j2w s2  r1
c  sj
2w s
s2j2w s2  r r1
d  r1
s2j2w s2  r1
A  s~yÿ y
  wjsp
s2j2w s2  r1
Note that we need the interest rate adjustment costs r1 to be small
enough to avoid an unstable response following output shocks, as current
in£ation depends on expected future in£ation.7 Note also that in a
reaction function such as (4) the interpretation of the constant term is
di¡erent from that in Clarida et al. (1998, 2000). This is because Clarida
et al. do not consider interest smoothing as part of the authorities'
optimization process: instead this is added as an ad hoc adjustment.
Basically, our model implies that the constant wr ÿ A is a function of
the real interest rate, in£ation target and in£ationary bias, while in
Clarida et al. it is referred to as simply the long-run component of the
real interest rate. This demonstrates that one has to be careful in
interpreting the estimated parameters of an interest rate reaction
function, as these largely depend on the way the monetary authorities'
loss function is speci¢ed.
7In general the system will be stable as long as wbjs > r1, which implies b
 > 1 and that the
expected in£ation response to the output gap is positive. Under rational expectations the
reaction function in (5) yields the following equilibrium in£ation rate:
pt 
br1
wbjsÿ r1
r  bs~yÿ y
  wjsp
wbjsÿ r1
ÿ br1
wbjsÿ r1
Rtÿ1  j1ÿ scet
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If there is no uncertainty about the monetary authorities' policy
objectives,8 both in£ation and interest rates will £uctuate stochastically
around a given mean.9 However, in practice, the authorities' policy goals
may not be observable (see Faust and Svensson, 1998; Muscatelli, 1998,
1999) and may vary over time (see Cukierman, 1992). Suppose for instance
that price and wage setters are uncertain about the policymaker's prefer-
ences over in£ation (his/her credibility):
wt  wtÿ1  ot ot  0; s2o 5
Suppose also that the policymaker cannot accurately predict the
supply shock, but has to forecast it (this forecast being private inform-
ation), and that wage and price setters cannot disentangle the uncertainty
due to the supply shock e and the preference shock o.10 The private sector
will then perceive the interest rate reaction function as
Rt  r ÿ a0  a1pet1  a2eft  a3Rtÿ1 6
where the a are functions of the same parameters (and a1 > 1 like b
) as
in (4) but with we (the expected value of w) and where ef is the forecast of
the supply shock. The private sector will update their expectations of w
and ef each period on the basis of the variances of e and o in a standard
signal extraction problem (see Cukierman, 1992; Muscatelli, 1999; Walsh,
1999).
Thus, following a regime change (e.g. the central bank being granted
independence) where some parameter of the monetary authority's
objective function shifts, if the regime change was not fully credible one
would see a gradual adjustment of in£ation and interest rates to a new
average level.
In practice one can estimate a forward-looking reaction function for
interest rates along the lines of (6) by constructing a series for expected
in£ation and the expected supply shock (or equivalently the expected
output gap), using an optimal updating scheme for the expected variables
(such as the Kalman ¢lter). If one then observes the timing of signi¢cant
shifts in the estimated reaction function parameters these should
correspond to major shifts in the policymaker's preferences (institutional
regime).11
8Muscatelli (1998, 1999) analyses a model of in£ation targeting with uncertain central bank
preferences.
9Given the nature of the supply shocks in the model, both in£ation and interest rates will be
stationary.
10In a monetary policy committee, the preference shock o can capture £uctuations in votes
between di¡erent `wings' of the committee.
11They might also be due to shifts in the underlying structural model which change the way
in which the authorities form their expectations about in£ation and the output gap, but
in this case we should observe changes in the models for expected in£ation and the
output gap.
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It is worth noting that by estimating a simple forward-looking
interest rate reaction function such as (6) one is not trying to capture the
exact way in which the monetary authorities actually react to economic
indicators which a¡ect real economic activity and expected in£ation.
Instead estimated forward-looking reaction functions based on (6)
capture the implicit way in which the central bank's operational rules/
decisions translate into a reaction function in terms of expected in£ation
and output gaps. Thus, for example, one might ¢nd some instability in
the estimated reaction function parameters which may not be due to a
change in policy preferences, but which might be due to a shift in the
intermediate targets used to achieve this outcome.12 For instance, in the
case of the UK, we know that in the early 1980s there was a move away
from monetary targets once it became clear that monetary policy was
becoming over-contractionary. But in general major and permanent shifts
in the estimated parameters will re£ect corresponding shifts in policy
preferences.
Therefore, estimating reaction functions such as (6) does not allow
one to directly estimate the authorities' preference parameters. It does
allow one to judge whether the operational rules have been stable and
whether the reliance on certain intermediate targets/indicators has taken
place at the expense of meeting ¢nal output stabilization and in£ation
objectives. Where some variability is found in the estimated parameters
this must be attributable either to changes in the authorities' preferences
regarding output and in£ation stabilization, or to some shift in the
relationship between the ¢nal policy objectives and the macroeconomic
indicators/intermediate objectives used by the authorities.
The theoretical literature on policy design has closely examined the
performance of forward-looking (in£ation expectations) policy rules (see
Faust and Svensson, 1998; Haldane and Batini, 1998; Svensson, 1998). In
part this is because of the emphasis given in some countries to the central
bank's in£ation forecast (cf. the Bank of England's regular in£ation
forecast based on current interest rate policies). In part it is because recent
contributions to the in£ation-targeting debate (Svensson, 1997b; Haldane
and Batini, 1998; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998) have shown the quasi-
optimality of interest rate policy rules based on in£ation forecasts. In
general the form of the in£ation-forecast-based rules considered by these
authors is
rt  yrt  jrtÿk  gEtptj  lyt ÿ yt  7
where rt is the short-term ex ante real interest rate, r

t represents the long-
run equilibrium real interest rate, while Etptj is the j-period-ahead
12This point is also stressed by Christiano et al. (1998) in the context of VAR models.
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in£ation rate expected at t. Past values of the interest rate to capture
interest rate smoothing behaviour and the output gap are also included.13
This can be rewritten in terms of the nominal interest rate:
Rt  a jRtÿk  oEtptj  lyt ÿ yt  8
where o  1 g, while a includes, as in equation (4), the equilibrium real
interest rate and the in£ation target.
Comparing (8) with (6) we see that, by generalizing the latter to
include a longer lead for in£ation and a longer lag for the interest rate
smoothing term, and substituting the output gap for the supply shock
forecast, (6) is identical to the forecast-based policy rule in (8).14
In what follows, we actually estimate reaction functions of the
following type:
Rt  a
Xk
i1
jiRtÿi  oEtptj  lyt ÿ yt  9
Typically we ¢nd that a maximum lag length of k  2 is su¤cient to
capture the degree of interest rate smoothing. Having estimated the basic
reaction function in (9), we then search for the appropriate lead ( j) for the
in£ation forecast term Etptj on the basis of goodness-of-¢t.
As noted in Haldane and Batini (1998), the speci¢cation of reaction
functions such as (9) allows one to analyse a number of issues. First, the
parameters o; j, i.e. the weight the bank puts on expected in£ation and
the lead term on it, determine the responsiveness of the instrument to
changes in the forecast and the forward-lookingness of the bank's horizon.
In addition, the parameters  j; k;j capture the degree of inertia in the
interest rate policy. Finally, a value of l di¡erent from zero implies that
the rule explicitly includes some reaction to deviations of output from
potential.
One potential problem in estimating structural reaction functions is
highlighted by Favero and Rovelli (1999), who argue that ¢nding a
signi¢cant output e¡ect in the reaction function might simply mean that
the central bank treats the current output gap as a leading indicator for
expected in£ation. In this case the output gap should be collinear with the
proxy for expected in£ation, or should predict in£ation forecast errors.
We were not able, as explained below, to ¢nd substantial collinearity
13Haldane and Batini (1998) note that the omission of an output gap term does not mean that
the authorities do not stabilize output, since by adjusting the degree of interest rate
smoothing and the lead in the in£ation forecast one can trade o¡ output stabilization
against in£ation stabilization.
14In practice the simple lag/lead speci¢cation for the interest rate reaction function derives
from the simple assumptions made about the transmission mechanism in this model.
This point is discussed in detail by Clarida et al. (2000). They note that their results are
not too sensitive to the choice of lag/lead of the output gap or expected in£ation term.
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between our measures of in£ation and the output gap, while the
correlation with in£ation forecast errors is small and often has the wrong
sign.15
ã Empirical Estimates
4.1 The Monetary Policy Instrument Variables
As in other recent attempts to estimate monetary authorities' reaction
functions (see Clarida et al., 1998), we focus on short-term money market
rates as the policy instrument.16 Clearly there are di¤culties in identifying
a single interest rate measure as the monetary policy instrument for the
whole of our sample period (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1995). One might
want to use di¡erent interest rate measures as the policy instrument at
di¡erent times (e.g. discount rates in the early part of the sample and repo
or call money rates towards the end of the sample period). But such ¢ne
distinctions would inevitably be arbitrary, and in any case short-term
money market rates will largely re£ect the authorities' monetary policy
stance under di¡erent operating procedures.
We do not, in this paper, adopt the procedure suggested by
Orphanides (1999) of using unrevised data series (i.e. the data which were
actually available to the authorities when the decisions were taken). The
main reason for this is that we want our results to be comparable to those
of other recent contributions (e.g. Clarida et al., 1998, 2000), and this
would not be possible if we used a completely di¡erent data set.
4.2 Measuring In£ation Expectations and the Output Gap
There are di¡erent methods to obtain measures of in£ation expectations
and the output gap. Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) use a quadratic trend to
obtain a measure of potential output and hence deviations of actual output
from this trend. In order to obtain a measure of in£ation expectations,
Clarida et al. use the errors-in-variables approach to modelling rational
expectations of in£ation whereby future actual values are used instead of
the expected values, and GMM estimation is used as in standard dynamic
rational expectations models.
Turning ¢rst to the output gap, one disadvantage of ¢tting non-linear
trends to the data is that it involves using the full sample in the
construction of the output trend. This involves making the assumption
that the policymaker uses future information on the path of output in the
15These results are not shown here for brevity, but are available from the authors upon
request.
16See the Data Appendix for details of the interest rate variables used.
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evaluation of the potential output trend. Indeed, forecasting the future
path of potential output is the key problem which central bankers face (see
Blinder, 1998)öassuming it away by not modelling the learning process
seems strange in our view.
Instead we proxy the learning process on the part of the monetary
authorities by using the structural time series (STS) approach proposed by
Harvey (1989) to generate series for the output gap and expected in£ation.
There are several advantages in using this approach. The ¢rst is that it
provides a useful and intuitive way of decomposing a series into trend and
cyclical components, which is particularly useful when one tries to estimate
a series for an unobservable trend such as potential output. Second, the
modelling approach lends itself readily to employing a Kalman ¢lter
estimation procedure, which allows one to proxy the learning process
by policymakers and economic agents. Third, the STS models are
parsimonious models which have reasonably rich autoregressive integrated
moving-average processes as their reduced forms.
Essentially, we estimate models for real GDP and in£ation for each
country, seeking to disentangle the trend, cycle and irregular com-
ponents.17 In the case of GDP, a convenient decomposition of the series
was made possible by applying the Kalman ¢lter on the trend component.
Subsequently, the latter was computed on the basis of one-step-ahead
predictions of the state vector. This way, estimates of potential output are
based only on past information, rather than on the full sample.
In the case of in£ation, we simply computed one-step-ahead
prediction errors from a univariate STS model to obtain a measure of
expected and unanticipated in£ation. Again, the models' parameters are
updated only gradually, as new data are added. In both cases, the STS
methodology makes the assumption that agents make the best use of all
available knowledge in a regime of imperfect information. In contrast, use
of a non-recursive estimation approach, such as errors-in-variables, has
the defect of using information from the whole sample, thus ignoring
policy regime shifts.
Figure 1 compares our measure of the output gap with that obtained
from a Hodrick^Prescott ¢ltering procedure for the USA.18 This shows
that our measure di¡ers markedly from that used in previous studies, and
indeed that quadratic or Hodrick^Prescott detrending procedures tend to
exaggerate the cyclical component. The reason why our series seems more
17The STAMP 5.0 software was used to estimate the STS models. Output and in£ation were
found to be I(1), and to have a signi¢cant cyclical component. The estimated STS models
are available on request from the authors. For a similar approach to forecasting in£ation
in the presence of potential structural breaks, see Stock and Watson (1999).
18Plots of the output gaps and in£ation expectations measures are not reported for reasons
of space, but are available on request. Fitting a quadratic trend, as in Clarida et al.
(1998), produces a more marked cyclical pattern.
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`noisy' is that it is what remains of the series once the trend component
has been removed (i.e. the cycle plus the irregular component).19 We also
investigate whether the data-generation processes of output and in£ation
in the countries of our sample have undergone any signi¢cant break
over the periods we study. If there are breaks in the underlying
processes for potential output and in£ation, one expects the policy
authorities to learn gradually about such shifts. Hence our Kalman ¢lter
approach generating expected in£ation and trend output measures would
be a more appropriate one than the full-information assumption made
in the existing literature.
There is now a wide range of technical contributions devoted to
studying trend breaks in unit roots and the problems associated with the
endogeneity of break points.20 Here we limit ourselves to understanding
whether the data-generation processes of output and in£ation have
undergone major shifts over our sample period, leaving aside the
determination of the exact number and position of the break points. We
employ the class of tests in Hansen (1992b) and Andrews and Ploberger
(1994). They all belong to the broad category of Chow-type tests with
unknown break point, and build upon the assessment of the signi¢cance of
Fig. 1 USAöHodrick^Prescott and Filtered STS Measures of the Output Gap
19Whether the irregular component should be included is obviously a matter for debate. In
practice it is unlikely to be a pure forecast error, and hence should probably be included.
However, our estimates do not change markedly when only the cycle measure is
included.
20For an extensive account of this debate, see Stock (1994).
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the value of the likelihood ratio, Wald and Lagrange multiplier statistics
derived from recursive switching regressions. We use the MeanF, SupF
and the L c variants advocated by Hansen (1992b). The ¢rst two tests have
parameter constancy as their null against the alternative of sudden breaks,
whereas the latter statistic is for the alternative of a smooth change. In
our case, the testing strategy requires prior estimation of univariate models
for output and in£ation. We adopt simple autoregressive speci¢cations
including trends and constants when required, and the semiparametric,
fully modi¢ed estimator of Phillips and Hansen (1990) and Hansen
(1992a). The latter is a two-step methodology that ¢rst estimates the
asymptotic covariance matrix of the system and then provides regression
parameters.21 Tests on the null of parameter stability are ¢nally carried
out.22
The test statistics are reported in Table 1 for all the countries we
examine. In the case of in£ation, the sample covers the years 1971Q3^
1997Q4, whereas for GDP some data constraints for Sweden and New
Zealand substantially shortened the sample we used. The ¢rst column of
each section displays the estimated statistic for the three tests. For both
output and in£ation the results are clear-cut, with all countries displaying
instability at standard signi¢cance levels. These estimates are robust to
changes in the kernel and bandwidth parameter chosen to ¢lter the
residuals, as well as to alternative functional forms for the speci¢ed
models. These results support our modelling approach.
4.3 Estimating Policy Rules
In estimating (9) the appropriate reaction lead to expected in£ation  j
was usually found to be four quarters for most countries. This result
broadly agrees with the ¢ndings of Batini and Haldane's dynamic
simulations of a calibrated theoretical model, where the optimum lead
length on the in£ation forecast is found to lie between three and six
quarters. However, in some key cases, as we shall see, di¡erent results
emerge.
Lags of the dependent variable are always found to be signi¢cant.
This is not surprising, as interest rate smoothing considerations appear to
be a generally accepted feature of monetary policy (see Almeida and
Goodhart, 1996; Bernanke and Mihov, 1997; Goodhart, 1999). We detect
a substantial amount of policy inertia in all the countries examined.
21Additional details on the testing procedure, as well as on the results we summarize here,
can be obtained from the authors upon request.
22Estimates were conducted by adapting a modi¢ed GAUSS code kindly provided by Bruce
Hansen. Hansen (1992b) tabulates asymptotic critical values for each of the tests
performed here.
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One di¡erence between our approach in this paper and that in other
studies is that we do not take for granted, or assume, any structural break
in the behaviour of the monetary authorities. Also, we have not imposed
any particular structure for any shifts in monetary policy. This is because
we want to test whether any change can be detected in correspondence to
announced regime shifts.
For this reason, we ¢rst estimated the reaction function (9) for each
country over the full sample periodöextending in the G3's case back to
Table "
Tests for Parameter Instability
Test GDP
In£ation
1972^97
In£ation
1980^97
USA
L c 0.548* 0.543* 1.762***
MeanF 7.946** 10.713*** 9.495***
SupF 23.682*** 68.269*** 48.400***
Germany
L c 0.339 1.553*** 0.651**
MeanF 4.931 14.422*** 8.195***
SupF 47.889*** 25.059*** 58.105***
Japan
L c 0.298 0.743** 0.998***
MeanF 5.587* 5.913* 7.987***
SupF 15.877* 29.530*** 28.035***
UK
L c 0.514* 0.624** 2.049***
MeanF 13.150*** 5.915** 11.247***
SupF 43.787*** 29.530*** 48.371***
Canada
L c 0.254 1.406*** 1.383***
MeanF 5.449* 12.803*** 12.500***
SupF 24.662*** 49.207*** 55.908***
Sweden
L c 0.334 1.137*** 0.959***
MeanF 7.846** 10.848*** 24.192***
SupF 14.731* 31.085*** 73.784***
New Zealand
L c 0.481* 1.097*** 0.484*
MeanF 9.047*** 21.772*** 8.051***
SupF 26.849*** 92.627*** 27.016***
L c, MeanF, SupF are de¢ned as testing the null of stability against non-constancy
on the parameters of univariate autoregressive models for in£ation (four-quarter
change in CPI) and real GDP. Constants and linear time trends were included
when relevant.
*, **, *** Signi¢cance of the relevant F statistic at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and
1 per cent, respectively (for tabulated critical values, see Hansen,1992b).
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the end of Bretton Woodsöand conducted a recursive analysis on the
magnitude and the signi¢cance of regressors. Using structural stability
tests we were then able to detect major breaks in interest rate policy. As
most major shifts in interest rate policies took place in the 1970s or early
1980s, we then re-estimated a reaction function for each country over the
post-1980 period, and again performed recursive tests and stability
analysis. This allowed us to detect any parameter shifts in the reaction
functions since 1980, and to interpret these shifts and any structural breaks
in the light of announced institutional changes or shifts in policy regime.
Finally, as in Clarida et al. (1998), we allow for the possibility that
the monetary authorities might have responded to other intermediate
objectives not included in our baseline speci¢cation in (9). The reason for
doing this is twofold. First, if the baseline model does not perform well,
we can check whether this is due to the targeting of some other
intermediate objective. Second, institutional accounts of monetary policy
suggest that these other variables might matter. Lagged values of money
growth, changes in the exchange rates and in£uences from relevant foreign
interest rates were included as additional regressors.
4.4 Interest Rate Reaction Functions: the G3 Countries
We now turn to our empirical results. Monetary institutions in the G3
(the USA, Germany and Japan) have been remarkably stable during the
sample period; i.e. the relationship between the political system and
monetary institutions has not changed in these countries.23 In the USA
and Germany the central bank enjoys/enjoyed a relatively high degree of
independence (see Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman, 1992) and is best de¢ned
as a `goal-independent' central bank,24 i.e. a bank which is not held
accountable for achieving a certain policy target. For instance German
monetary policy has been de¢ned as a regime of `disciplined discretion'
(Laubach and Posen, 1997), whereas US monetary policy during the
Greenspan era has been de¢ned as `pre-emptive monetary policy without
an explicit nominal anchor' (Mishkin and Posen, 1997). An interesting
issue examined here is whether the success of the Fed in recent years has
23Since 1979, European Monetary System (EMS) membership might have constrained the
Bundesbank's ability to retain control of monetary policy. Most discussions on the
deutschmark's role in the EMS have concluded that the Bundesbank largely retained her
independence (Von Hagen, 1995).
24For instance, both Neumann (1996) and Clarida and Gertler (1997) argue that the
Bundesbank pursues multiple objectives and is £exible in attaining them, i.e. emphasis
sometimes shifts from one policy target to another. For a similar view see Mishkin and
Posen (1997). For a contrasting view, stressing continuity in the Bundesbank's use of
monetary targets, see Issing (1997).
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been achieved by changing the way in which interest rates respond to
policy objectives.
Our estimated models are reported in Tables 2^8. For ease of
exposition we report only the long-run static solutions of the model. This
makes it more straightforward to interpret the e¡ects in terms of the
theory and with earlier studies which estimate the model long-run
parameters directly using GMM. Each regression contains one or two lags
of the dependent variable. These autoregressive terms are always highly
signi¢cant and generally are large, with their sum equal to 0.7^0.9 in all
cases. As we are only reporting long-run e¡ects, the standard errors shown
in Tables 2^8 are asymptotic standard errors for each estimated coe¤cient.
Table 2 reports the estimated reaction function for Germany, respectively
for the full sample period25 and since 1980. The estimates for the whole
sample show that interest rates reacted to in£ation expectations (with a
point estimate greater than one)26 and output. Adding the US Federal
Funds rates only marginally improves the ¢t of the interest rate reaction
function. The variable addition tests show that neither money growth nor
the exchange rate (measured as the index of real e¡ective exchange rate)
seemed to exert an independent signi¢cant e¡ect on German interest rates.
There seems to be a mildly signi¢cant e¡ect of the Federal Funds rate,
but this e¡ect is not stable over the cycle, and probably picks up a
correlation between the German and US business cycles. This con¢rms
analogous results in Clarida and Gertler (1997) and Bernanke and Mihov
(1997). Since 1971, the Bundesbank set target ranges for the growth of
broad monetary aggregates, but over the last 15 years of its operation
actual growth rates often exceeded (fell short of) the upper (lower) limit of
the targeted band.27 This con¢rms most modern accounts of the
Bundesbank's monetary policy stance which suggest that monetary targets
were not the Bank's primary objective but that discretionary undershoots
and overshoots of the target bands were allowed where this did not impair
the achievement of the in£ationary objective.
The diagnostic tests for the estimated model in Table 2 show some
signs of non-normality (and possibly autoregressive conditional hetero-
scedasticity (ARCH)) in the residuals, as is the case for all our estimated
models, but this is due to the bunching of a small number of large residuals
at the end of the 1970s, and this is apparent from the post-1980
estimates.
25Our sample period ends in 1999Q2, so the issue of the switch from the Bundesbank to the
European Central Bank does not arise.
26As shown in Section 3, this is su¤cient to ensure dynamic stability, providing the dynamic
IS and aggregate supply equations (equations (1) and (2)) have the signs expected by
economic theory. Estimating the dynamic IS and aggregate supply equations is beyond
the scope of this paper.
27See Von Hagen (1995), Issing (1997).
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Table á
Germany
Regressor/
Sample Constant
Expected
in£ation
Output
gap
Federal Funds
rate
Variable
addition tests c Summary statistics
1970Q2^
1999Q2 a
ÿ0.179
(2.016)
1.529
(0.4437)
1.143
(0.616)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.456
(0.634)
0.560
(0.572)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 108)
ARCH 4 F(4, 105)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 112)
0.886
0.875
1.79
1.540 [0.1836]
4.538 [0.0020]
60.542 [0.0000]
1.259 [0.2643]
1970Q3^
1999Q2 b
(adding Federal
Funds rate)
ÿ1.679
(1.823)
1.149
(0.3)
0.783
(0.401)
0.425
(0.164)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.194
(0.824)
0.027
(0.974)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 106)
ARCH 4 F(4, 103)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 110)
0.892
0.857
1.70
1.842 [0.1109]
4.185 [0.0035]
65.493 [0.0000]
1.947 [0.1657]
1980Q1^
1999Q2 a
0.348
(1.327)
1.895
(0.376)
0.759
(0.372)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.561
(0.573)
1.098
(0.339)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 69)
ARCH 4 F(4, 66)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 73)
0.958
0.532
2.01
0.734 [0.6003]
2.419 [0.0574]
20.209 [0.0000]
0.487 [0.4874]
1980Q1^
1999Q2 b
(adding Federal
Funds rate)
ÿ0.296
(1.247)
1.514
(0.2968)
0.531
(0.280)
0.237
(0.116)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.412
(0.523)
2.030
(0.158)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 68)
ARCH 4 F(4, 65)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 72)
0.996
0.520
1.69
1.138 [0.3487]
2.370 [0.0615]
13.733 [0.0010]
1.079 [0.3025]
a Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter-ahead expected in£ation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
b As for the note above, but now with one lag of the Federal Funds rate on the right-hand side.
c We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on current and lagged money growth (M3, quarter and annual di¡erence) and both the change and the lagged (shown in the table) value
of the exchange rate vis-a© -vis the US$ were tested by an F version of the Wald test. p values in parentheses.
Asymptotic standard errors of estimated parameters are in parentheses. AR is a Lagrange multiplier test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH struc-
ture, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional misspeci¢cation. p values in square brackets.
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The estimated reaction function for Germany does not display any
major shifts, apart from slight variation around the time of reuni¢cation,
with the estimated coe¤cients relatively constant across subsamples. We
also found that a four-quarter lead for expected in£ation works best for both
the full sample and the post-1980 sample. Figure 2 shows one-step up and
N-step down Chow tests, as well as the estimated coe¤cient and standard
error bands and t values for the expected in£ation, Federal Funds and output
gap regressors for the post-1980 regression. The latter ¢gure shows the
long-run estimated coe¤cient as well as the asymptotic standard errors.28
This con¢rms the stability of the Bundesbank's policy rule, but shows that
the size of the estimated response to the output gap fell slightly after the
uni¢cation shock in 1990^91. This shows, in line with recent work (Clarida
et al., 1998), that monetary policy in Germany reacted systematically to
cyclical conditions, even though the Bundesbank's declared monetary
strategy (see Issing, 1997) was expressed in terms of monetary targets. Note
also that this result is not dependent on whether the money growth variable
is added to the interest rate equation before or after the in£ation and output
gap term. Indeed, following the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crises
Fig. 2 Germany, 1980Q1^1999Q2: Recursive Coe¤cients and Standard Error Bands;
One-step, N-step Up Chow tests (5 per cent)
28Again note that these are the asymptotic standard errors, not the usual recursive least
squares (RLS) standard errors. They were computed using the authors' own GAUSS
routines and plotted using GiveWin. This explains why there is so much variation from
period to period and they are not as smooth as RLS standard errors.
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in 1992^93, the Bundesbank's responsiveness to the output gap seemed to
increase slightly. But the overall picture is one of overall stability, indicating
stable underlying policy preferences and operational rules.29
Our estimates for the Japanese reaction function (Table 3, Fig. 3) over
the whole sample show an insigni¢cant coe¤cient on the output gap,
whereas that on expected in£ation is signi¢cant but well below one until
post-1995. Furthermore, the equation displays some instability in the mid-
1980s. We tried to improve on this by including additional regressors. It
turns out that the US Federal Funds rate exerts a strong in£uence on
Japanese policy. This con¢rms that in the 1980s Japanese monetary policy
might have been hamstrung by agreements on managing the value of the
yen:US$ rate. It also con¢rms the casual observation that Japanese policy
might not have been su¤ciently geared towards domestic targets (see The
Economist, 17 July 1998) and that this might have contributed to the
excessive de£ation in Japan in the 1990s. Unfortunately what seems to
have happened is that by the time that Japan's monetary policy became
more consistent with the pursuit of output and in£ation stabilization, the
domestic economy was already in crisis.
Fig. 3 Japan, 1980Q1^1999Q2: Recursive Coe¤cients and Standard Error Bands;
One-step, N-step Up Chow tests (5 per cent)
29We would not wish to argue that the Bundesbank's policy stance has never shifted over
time. Indeed, as Berger and Woitek (1998) have shown, the political composition of the
Bundesbank's Council seems to have exerted an important in£uence on the way it
formulated monetary policy since 1945.
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Table â
Japan
Regressor/
Sample Constant
Expected
in£ation
Output
gap
Federal Funds
rate
Variable
addition tests c Summary statistics
1970Q3^
1999Q2 a
2.527
(1.011)
0.7245
(0.1789)
0.719
(0.526)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.97
(0.38)
3.49
(0.034)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 106)
ARCH 4 F(4, 103)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 110)
0.964
0.601
2.21
2.108 [0.0700]
2.791 [0.0301]
40.439 [0.0000]
6.670 [0.0111]
1970Q3^
1999Q2 b
(adding Federal
Funds rate)
1.99
(1.23)
0.5305
(0.098)
0.096
(0.311)
0.686
(0.137)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.307
(0.736)
1.700
(0.19)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 105)
ARCH 4 F(4, 102)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 109)
0.971
0.549
2.13
1.590 [0.1692]
3.432 [0.0113]
20.266 [0.0000]
4.427 [0.0377]
1980Q1^
1999Q2 a
1.112
(1.053)
2.029
(0.479)
0.406
(0.475)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
1.39
(0.25)
0.971
(0.383)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 67)
ARCH 4 F(4, 64)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 71)
0.968
0.539
1.92
1.018 [0.4143]
1.605 [0.1837]
27.08 [0.0000]
8.637 [0.0044]
1980Q1^
1999Q2 b
(adding Federal
Funds rate)
ÿ1.000
(1.152)
1.277
(0.4464)
Dropped
because not
signi¢cant
0.417
(0.167)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.302
(0.74)
0.640
(0.530)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 68)
ARCH 4 F(4, 65)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 72)
0.970
0.528
1.84
0.792 [0.5591]
3.224 [0.0179]
22.487 [0.0000]
10.385 [0.0019]
a Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter-ahead expected in£ation, output gap and two lags of the dependent variable.
b As for the note above, but now with one lag of the Federal Funds rate and with no output gap (because insigni¢cant) on the right-hand side.
c We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth and changes in the current, once- and twice-lagged trade-weighted exchange rate were tested by an F version
of the Wald test. p values in parentheses.
Asymptotic standard errors of estimated parameters are in parentheses. AR is a Lagrange multiplier test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH struc-
ture, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional misspeci¢cation. p values in square brackets.
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The US reaction function estimated over the whole sample period
(Table 4) is characterized by a coe¤cient on in£ation which is not
signi¢cantly larger than one and by an insigni¢cant coe¤cient on the
output gap. However, diagnostic tests and recursive graphics show a
marked period of instability between 1979 and 1982, when the Fed
switched from interest rate targeting to monetary base targeting, which
implied greater instability in money market rates. Since then, the Fed
has opted for the targeting of money market (Federal Funds) rates.
Goodfriend (1995) argues that the 1979^82 parenthesis of monetary base
targeting also marked the Fed decision to aggressively clamp down on
in£ation expectations, which was accomplished by 1985. Clarida et al.
suggest a stable policy environment post-1982. However, our recursive
estimates show that this is not the case. The output coe¤cient has the
wrong sign in the late 1980s, suggesting that interest rates were too low at
a time when the output gap was positive. Only in the 1990s does the output
coe¤cient sign become positive once more.
Our estimates over the post-1980 sample in Table 4 con¢rm that some
important changes seem to have taken place. US policy does seem to have
been less constant over time than Germany's. Interest rates seem to react
to in£ation expectations on a shorter horizon (a two-quarter horizon is
found to work best post-1985) and with a larger coe¤cient when the
reaction function is re-estimated over the latter part of the sample. Our
results reverse the conclusions of Clarida et al. (1998) using di¡erent
estimation methods, as they ¢nd an estimated coe¤cient on in£ation which
is much greater than one.
The picture changes completely if we focus on the post-1985 sample
(see Table 4). The equation is now stable, and includes a coe¤cient on
expected in£ation with a point estimate greater than unity (although it is
not signi¢cantly larger than one). The recursive graphs also con¢rm that
in the 1990s the Fed was adjusting interest rates to follow the output cycle
much more closely.30 Figure 4 shows a signi¢cant output gap e¡ect post-
1991.
Overall, the Fed looks very di¡erent from the Bundesbank until the
1990s. On this point our results di¡er sharply from those of Clarida et al.
The usual accounts suggest that, having successfully restrained in£ation
expectations in 1979^82, the Fed exploited her reputation to implement
30One caveat emerges from the theoretical model discussed above: in a full-information
context, i.e. when the private sector has learned about the bank's preferences, in£ation
expectations are highly collinear with the output cycle. This might bias the estimated
coe¤cient on the in£ation expectations regressor downwards. On the other hand, we ¢nd
only a very small correlation between our measures of expected in£ation and the output
gap. The analysis of the coe¤cients' covariance matrix also con¢rms that the correlation
between the coe¤cients is small and often has the wrong sign. These results are available
on request.
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Table ã
USA
Regressor/
Sample Constant
Expected
in£ation
Output
gap Variable addition tests c Summary statistics
1970Q3^
1999Q2 a
1.276
(2.018)
1.19
(0.3585)
0.508
(0.511)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
2.58
(0.08)
0.675
(0.513)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 106)
ARCH 4 F(4, 103)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 110)
0.804
1.48229
2.09
5.2527 [0.0002]
20.662 [0.0000]
104.05 [0.0000]
2.764 [0.0993]
1980Q1^
1999Q2 a
0.690
(1.875)
1.715
(0.433)
0.368
(0.418)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
5.69
(0.05)
0.637
(0.531)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 68)
ARCH 4 F(4, 65)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 72)
0.816
1.570
2.14
3.862 [0.0039]
42.388 [0.0000]
94.183 [0.0000]
3.133 [0.0809]
1985Q1^
1999Q2 b
3.159
(0.767)
0.723
(0.237)
0.748
(0.237)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.483
(0.617)
0.042
(0.958)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 49)
ARCH 4 F(4, 46)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 53)
0.936
0.468
1.68
1.621 [0.1721]
0.718 [0.5837]
0.031 [0.9847]
0.0235 [0.8787]
a Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap and two lags of the dependent variable.
b Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, two-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
c We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth and changes in a lagged trade-weighted index of e¡ective exchange rate were tested by an F version of the Wald
test on the baseline model augmented with each new variable. p values in parentheses.
Asymptotic standard errors of estimated parameters are in parentheses. AR is a Lagrange multiplier test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH struc-
ture, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional misspeci¢cation. p values in square brackets.
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countercyclical policies. But the Fed's policy coe¤cients (particularly the
output gap coe¤cient) suggest that a stable and correctly signed reaction
function only operated since the early 1990s.
The US example is striking because it shows that a stable institutional
set-up does not guarantee predictable policy outcomes. What we seem to
observe in the US case is a progressive tightening of policy responses in the
mid-1990s, probably linked to the uncertainty which existed in the Fed over
what was happening to potential output (Woodward, 2000). Since 1995 the
Fed's policy responses have become more predictable, but we await evidence
from the current slowdown to see whether this stability will persist.
These ¢ndings also broadly illustrate a substantive di¡erence between
the Fed's and Bundesbank's monetary strategies. The Bundesbank appears
to have responded more forcefully to movements in expected in£ation than
the Fed, judging from the in£ation expectation coe¤cient. Some authors
have suggested that this result is open to other interpretations. Mishkin
and Posen (1997) label the Fed policy as `just do it', or pre-emptive policy
without a nominal anchor. Their argument is that monetary policy must
act well in advance of a surge in in£ation expectations since the full impact
of monetary policy on in£ation takes long lags. The main disadvantage
of such a policy obviously lies in the di¤culty of establishing a clear policy
pattern with all the risks that this implies at times when the economy is
being hit by major exogenous shocks. Our results suggest that such prag-
matic and forward-looking policy should not be interpreted as if the Fed
Fig. 4 USA, 1980Q1^1999Q2: Recursive Coe¤cients and Standard Error Bands;
One-step, N-step Up Chow tests (5 per cent)
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systematically reacted to longer-term expectations, as in the Bundesbank's
case. In fact we found that shorter leads on the expected in£ation variable
(two instead of four quarters) seemed to work better in the case of the
USA for the post-1985 sample. This con¢rms the casual observation that
the Fed has chosen to signal its commitment to low in£ation in recent
years by reacting in advance to increases in in£ationary expectations.
However, in doing so, it has not always acted in a predictable way.
The other key results from this section are as follows. First, the G3
policy reaction functions look very di¡erent. One model does not ¢t all, in
sharp contrast to the view expressed by Chinn and Dooley (1997). Second,
despite having stable institutions, monetary policymaking in the G3 seems
to have evolved gradually in di¡erent directions: in Germany it became
more conservative post-uni¢cation. In Japan, it seems to have been led
astray by inappropriate external objectives until recently. In the USA, the
highly successful countercyclical monetary policy of the Fed seems to be
purely a 1990s phenomenon. These discrepancies are not apparent in the
existing empirical literature because of the tendency to only report full-
sample estimates for the 1980s.
4.5 Interest Rate Reaction Functions: the In£ation Targeters
Turning to the other countries in our sample, we shall relate our results
to major changes in the way in which monetary policy was conducted. As
noted above, a variety of factors may cause shifts in estimated monetary
policy reaction functions. Some of them, such as highly publicized
institutional innovations and political changes, are easily identi¢ed from
descriptive accounts of monetary policy and will be discussed here. Other
shifts in the reaction functions may have occurred for `technical' reasons.
These include the instability of demand for money functions, which
eventually caused the demise of monetary aggregates. Similarly, in other
countries the authorities may have relied (formally or informally) on
indicators or intermediate objectives that were subsequently abandoned.
These too are important in understanding our results, and will be discussed
as they show up in our estimates.
For most of the sample period, the central banks of the second group
of countries (Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK) have had
limited independence in the conduct of monetary policy compared to the
central banks of the G3 countries (see Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman,
1992). During the 1990s explicit in£ation targets were announced in all
countries, but there are important di¡erences within the group in terms of
institutional arrangements and the role the central bank plays in achieving
the target. In fact only New Zealand's central bank and the UK's central
bank (since 1997) have been given a legal mandate to achieve the in£ation
target.
510 The Manchester School
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 2002.
In the UK, the Bank of England was only granted independence in
1997. However, there have been several changes in monetary strategy in
the last two decades. The election of the Thatcher government in 1979
signalled a long-lasting shift in the collective attitude towards in£ation.
Instead of adopting an institutional approach the Conservative govern-
ments tried to build a reputation for their commitment to low in£ation
policies, experimenting ¢rst with monetary targets and then adopting a
more eclectic approach to intermediate objectives from the mid-1980s.
After a short spell of ERM membership in 1990^92, the government then
opted for a new monetary policy framework involving the announcement
of formal in£ation targets. The Conservative government chose not to
delegate the implementation of monetary policy to an independent and
accountable central bank. Instead the government's own reputation was
the ultimate guarantee of the policy commitment. However, the central
bank played the key role of publicly assessing the overall consistency of
the policy stance. The newly elected Labour government in 1997 then
sought to further bolster the in£ation-targeting framework by granting the
Bank of England instrument independence. Monetary policy decisions
are now taken by the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee.
Since the breakdown of M1 as an intermediate target in the early
1980s, until 1991 the Bank of Canada had not committed herself to any
predetermined policy pattern, apart from the reiteration of the long-term
goal of price stability. Neither intermediate target nor time frame was
apparently cast in the attempt to pursue the long-run objective, while
various monetary and credit aggregates (including the exchange rate with
the US$) were used in turn as information variables. In 1991 the govern-
ment and the bank set a sequence of year-to-year target bands for the
in£ation rate, so as to bring about a gradual reduction in in£ation.
However, the central bank was not granted a legislative mandate to
achieve these in£ation targets nor was a procedure established which
would hold the central bank accountable for missing the targets. The
`doctrine of dual responsibility' traditionally attributes the ultimate re-
sponsibility for the results of monetary policy to the Minister of Finance.
Thus, the Bank of Canada has enjoyed only a limited degree of formal
independence (see Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman, 1992). Nonetheless, the
central bank had been calling publicly for a stricter control on in£ation
since 1988, while from 1994 the degree of policy transparency has in-
creased markedly (Mishkin and Posen, 1997).
Since 1977 Sweden had been pegging its currency unilaterally, ¢rst to
a trade-weighted basket of currencies, then switching to the ECU in May
1991. However, the strength by which this commitment to the external
anchor was pursued varied signi¢cantly, as numerous devaluations took
place (Horngren and Lindberg, 1994). To some extent the Riksbank
became less accommodating to in£ation shocks after 1982. The marginal
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(overnight) rate was then extensively used to regulate large currency £ows
during the ¢xed exchange rate period. After the November 1992 crisis the
Riksbank £oated the krona and announced the unilateral adoption of an
in£ation target in January 1993.31 However, the bank has never been
granted an independent status, and political in£uences on the board are
important (Svensson, 1995; McCallum, 1996).
Finally, we turn to the evolution of the monetary regime in New
Zealand, which switched to in£ation targeting in 1989. Historically, New
Zealand's Reserve Bank had a degree of independence which ranked lowest
amongst the OECD countries (see Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman, 1992).
Correspondingly, New Zealand's in£ation rate was well above the OECD
average. Until the mid-1980s monetary policy relied mainly on regulation
and administrative controls of capital markets. From 1985 the Bank turned
to a more market-oriented approach to monetary control, and based policy
decisions on a variety of indicators such as the exchange rate, the term
structure of interest rates, monetary aggregates and output (see Leiderman
and Svensson, 1995). The Reserve Bank Act, introduced in 1990 to establish
a legislative commitment to price stability, gave the Government and the
Central Bank Governor the mandate to agree on a policy target (it was
decided that this should be an in£ation target) and explicitly contemplates
the possibility of the Governor's dismissal if the set target is not met.
Figure 5 plots the expected in£ation series and the ex ante real interest
rates computed using our expected in£ation series for the group of
in£ation targeters in our study. It is interesting to note that in the case of
Sweden, Canada and New Zealand ex ante real rates appear to have been
pushed substantially higher and well above in£ation expectations well
before the announcement or the adoption of targets.32 Also, in£ation
expectations, at least in the case of the UK, Sweden and New Zealand,
seem to have been somewhat subdued prior to the announced regime
changes. At ¢rst blush, the regime change seems to have simply
consolidated the gains in terms of lower in£ation.
Our estimates for the UK (Table 5) show that over the whole sample
period the coe¤cient on in£ation expectations is not signi¢cantly larger
than one. Furthermore, the money market interest rate seems to have
reacted to both the exchange rate and the money supply.
Given the instability in the estimated reaction function until the mid-
1980s, we re-estimated the equation for the 1985^99 sample.33 This shows
that the policy horizon became substantially shorter after 1985, interest
31The term unilateral emphasizes the lack of a legislative mandate to achieve a speci¢c
in£ation target. See Svensson (1995) for a detailed account of these events.
32UK in October 1992; Canada, January 1991; Sweden, January 1993; New Zealand, end
1989.
33Sterling came under pressure in early 1985 which might explain why the one-step Chow test
is signi¢cant. However, this does seem to be a single outlier.
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rates reacting to one-quarter-ahead expected in£ation, and the coe¤cient
on expected in£ation becomes signi¢cantly larger than one. Within this,
other minor shifts in policy regimes are also apparent (see Fig. 6), such as
the 1985 sterling crisis and the exit from the ERM. The exit from the
ERM (with the greater emphasis towards internal rather than external
objectives) is apparent from the coe¤cient on expected in£ation, which
increases towards unity between 1992 and 1994, and the increased re-
sponse to the output gap. Interestingly, at least with a sample up to
1999Q2, Bank of England independence in 1997 seems to have changed
little. The watershed as far as UK monetary policy is concerned seems to
have been 1992.
Our estimates for Canada over the full sample period (1975^99) yield
somewhat puzzling results (see Table 6). When the US Federal Funds rate
is added to the equation, the coe¤cients both on the output gap and on
expected in£ation are not signi¢cant. Clearly, as in the case of Germany
and Japan, the Federal Funds rate absorbs part of the signi¢cance of the
in£ation variable. Even though M1 was the intermediate policy target in
Canada between 1975 and 198234 (Freedman, 1995), we could not ¢nd a
very signi¢cant role for the money supply in our estimated reaction
function. Furthermore, there are clear signs of instability in the estimated
Fig. 5 UK, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden (clockwise): Real ex ante Interest Rates
(bold line) and Four-quarter Expected In£ation
34In 1982 it was o¤cially abandoned due to innovations in the ¢nancial sector.
Does Institutional Change Really Matter? 513
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 2002.
Table ä
UK
Regressor/
Sample Constant
Expected
in£ation
Output
gap FIBOR
Variable
addition tests d Summary statistics
1975Q2^
1999Q2 a
4.479
(1.818)
0.810
(0.237)
0.991
(0.465)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
1.78
(0.17)
3.434
(0.067)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 88)
ARCH 4 F(4, 85)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 92)
0.873
1.149
1.93
1.049 [0.3945]
0.235 [0.9177]
28.757 [0.0000]
0.140 [0.7092]
1975Q2^
1999Q2 b
(adding
Germany's
FIBOR)
1.555
(1.752)
0.662
(0.136)
0.953
(0.276)
0.660
(0.243)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
4.88
(0.03)
1.67
(0.2)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 87)
ARCH 4 F(4, 84)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 91)
0.878
1.132
1.83
0.923 [0.4703]
0.260 [0.9028]
22.947 [0.0000]
0.238 [0.6267]
1980Q1^
1999Q2 b
(adding
Germany's
FIBOR)
2.107
(1.643)
0.884
(0.208)
0.620
(0.257)
0.483
(0.276)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.668
(0.516)
0.003
(0.959)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 69)
ARCH 4 F(4, 66)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 73)
0.916
0.967
1.89
0.570 [0.7224]
0.040 [0.9970]
19.48 [0.0001]
2.253 [0.1376]
1985Q1^
1999Q2 c
2.875
(0.705)
1.402
(0.176)
0.571
(0.186)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.902
(0.412)
4.29
(0.043)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 49)
ARCH 4 F(4, 46)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 53)
0.924
0.898
1.40
0.789 [0.5629]
2.038 [0.1047]
22.361 [0.0000]
0.767 [0.3850]
a Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
b Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap and one lag of Germany's FIBOR (EURIBOR 1998Q4 onwards).
c Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, one-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
d We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth, changes in the current and lagged trade-weighted index of e¡ective exchange rate were tested by an F version
of the Wald test. p values in parentheses.
Asymptotic standard errors of estimated parameters are in parentheses. AR is a Lagrange multiplier test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH struc-
ture, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional misspeci¢cation. p values in square brackets.
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function in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Re-estimating the equation for
the post-1980 sample, the coe¤cient on in£ation expectations becomes
signi¢cant but smaller than unity, whereas e¡ective exchange rate vari-
ations now seem to be signi¢cant alongside the Federal Funds rate.
What about the impact of in£ation targets? The introduction of
targets does not seem to have caused a major change. At most there seems
to have been a temporary impact on interest rate policy just prior to the
introduction of in£ation targets. Figure 7 shows a rise in the expected
in£ation coe¤cient around the period 1990^91, but the shift is small.
Descriptive accounts of Canadian monetary policy in this period (Mishkin
and Posen, 1997) point out that the in£ation target was used as a guidance
for expectations, but stress that on several occasions monetary policy was
in fact constrained to react to external conditions, such as exchange rate
developments and the behaviour of US monetary policy.
Our estimated reaction function seems to con¢rm this. Furthermore,
the Bank did experiment for a short period with a short-run operational
target, the index of monetary conditions (MCI). Although it has now been
abandoned, MCI changes included variations in a short-term interest rate
and in the trade-weighted exchange rate. Clearly, this highlights the
importance of external constraints on the Bank of Canada's policy stance,
and Canada does not seem to ¢t the model of an `implicit in£ation
targeter'.
Fig. 6 UK, 1980Q1^1999Q2: Recursive Coe¤cients and Standard Error Bands;
One-step, N-step Up Chow tests (5 per cent)
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Table å
Canada
Regressor/
Sample Constant
Expected
in£ation
Output
gap
Federal Funds
rate
Variable
addition tests d Summary statistics
1975Q3^
1999Q2 a
2.504
(2.013)
1.316
(0.3823)
1.406
(1.134)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
0.674
(0.512)
2.94
(0.089)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 106)
ARCH 4 F(4, 103)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 110)
0.804
1.482
2.09
5.253 [0.0002]
20.662 [0.0000]
104.05 [0.0000]
2.764 [0.0993]
1975Q3^
1999Q2 b
0.817
(0.946)
0.3445
(0.1503)
0.271
(0.370)
0.835
(0.138)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
2.268
(0.10)
2.14
(0.146)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 85)
ARCH 4 F(4, 82)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 89)
0.827
1.579
1.70
4.939 [0.0005]
6.401 [0.0002]
22.564 [0.0000]
2.174 [0.1439]
1980Q1^
1999Q2 c
0.809
(1.056)
0.603
(0.2358)
Output gap not
signi¢cant
Exchange rate:
ÿ0.536
(0.262)
0.695
(0.197)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
2.065
(0.134)
5.682
(0.02)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 67)
ARCH 4 F(4, 64)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 71)
0.857
1.569
1.60
7.689 [0.0000]
5.517 [0.0007]
20.634 [0.0000]
2.646 [0.1083]
a Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap and two lags of the dependent variable.
b Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap, two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of the Federal Funds rate.
c Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter ahead expected in£ation, exchange rate, two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of the Federal Funds rate.
d Prior to estimating the third regression we tested for the addition of some regressors to the ¢rst regression. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth and the change in the trade-weighted index of
e¡ective exchange rate were tested by an F version of the Wald test. p values in parentheses.
Asymptotic standard errors of estimated parameters are in parentheses. AR is a Lagrange multiplier test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH struc-
ture, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional misspeci¢cation. p values in square brackets.
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The full-sample estimates (1982^99) for Sweden show a signi¢cant
but relatively low coe¤cient on expected in£ation, while the output gap is
not signi¢cant at all (see Table 7). The main instability in the estimated
reaction function corresponds to the time of the ERM crisis in 1992.
Monetary policy in Sweden was externally tied to the ERM until 1992,
when the krona was forced to devalue despite an unprecedented surge in
domestic interest rates. Sweden has moved to in£ation targeting since then.
However, Svensson (1995) points out that the credibility of the new regime
has been hampered by a number of factors, such as the deep political
divisions over the conduct of monetary policy and the relatively large
budget de¢cits.
Once a dummy is included for the ERM crisis in 1992, the coe¤cient
on expected in£ation rises and becomes more signi¢cant, but the point
estimate remains below one, and the output gap variable remains insigni-
¢cant at the 5 per cent level. The main story that emerges from Fig. 8 is
the dominance of external factors (the German interest rate and the
exchange rate) before 1992, and since 1992 a (slowly) growing importance
of the domestic in£ation variable. However, even by the end of our sample
external variables seem to matter, and the coe¤cient on expected in£ation
remains below unity. The Swedish case is probably best described as
`credibility-building' since 1992, but without a major break due to the
introduction of in£ation targeting.
New Zealand has been the most often cited in£ation-targeting
Fig. 7 Canada, 1980Q1^1999Q2: Recursive Coe¤cients and Standard Error Bands;
One-step, N-step Up Chow tests (5 per cent)
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Table æ
Sweden
Regressor/
Sample Constant
Expected
in£ation
Output
gap FIBOR
Variable
addition tests c Summary statistics
1982Q2^
1999Q2 a
3.884
(1.514)
1.134
(0.2593)
0.628
(0.687)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
1.162
(0.319)
3.57
(0.034)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 59)
ARCH 4 F(4, 56)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 63)
0.902
1.066
1.90
1.339 [0.2605]
0.913 [0.4629]
9.813 [0.0074]
4.156 [0.0456]
1982Q2^
1999Q2 b
2.02
(1.474)
0.773
(0.189)
Output gap not
signi¢cant
Exchange rate:
0.495
(0.198)
0.669
(0.268)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
FIBOR
0.674
(0.513)
6.18
(0.015)
4.092
(0.021)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 59)
ARCH 4 F(4, 56)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 63)
0.909
1.036
1.85
1.391 [0.2408]
3.040 [0.0244]
2.415 [0.2989]
4.702 [0.0339]
a Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
b Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, four-quarter ahead expected in£ation, the change in the trade-weighted index of e¡ective exchange rate, the lagged three-month
German FIBOR and one lag of the dependent variable.
c Before estimating the second regression we tested for the addition of some regressors to the ¢rst regression. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth, changes in the current trade-weighted index of
e¡ective exchange rate and the lagged three-month German FIBOR were tested by an F version of the Wald test. p values in parentheses.
Asymptotic standard errors of estimated parameters are in parentheses. AR is a Lagrange multiplier test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH struc-
ture, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional misspeci¢cation. p values in square brackets.
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experiment, not least because in this case the legal arrangements designed
to regulate the bank activity follow the prescriptions of monetary policy
design theory more closely than elsewhere (see Walsh, 1995). The estimated
equation for the full sample (see Table 8, Fig. 9) shows that interest rates
seem to have reacted only to expected in£ation from 1994 (the estimated
coe¤cient is signi¢cantly larger than one) whereas the output gap does not
seem to matter much.35 The Bank contract cites the exchange rate as
a possible justi¢cation for deviating from the announced policy, and
interestingly we ¢nd a signi¢cant exchange rate e¡ect over the 1983^99
sample. The other main point to note from Fig. 9 is the gradual rise in the
in£ation expectations coe¤cient after 1990 from a value below unity. The
New Zealand case does seem to be one where the introduction of targets
made a di¡erence to interest rate policy, but the change was gradual and
external objectives also remain important. Since 1995 policy seems to be
essentially stable with little variation in the estimated coe¤cients. The other
main point to note is that in£ation targeting does not seem to have allowed
the authority a greater leeway to stabilize output £uctuations, in contrast
to the usual propositions in the theoretical literature.
Fig. 8 Sweden, 1982Q2^1999Q2: Recursive Coe¤cients and Standard Error Bands;
One-step, N-step Up Chow tests (5 per cent)
35Hutchison and Walsh (1998) suggested that the Reserve Bank looked at output stabilization
as an additional objective, but the output gap term is not signi¢cant in our estimates.
Nevertheless, as pointed out previously, the absence of an output gap term in the
reaction function does not preclude some degree of output stabilization.
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Table ð
New Zealand
Regressor/
Sample Constant
Expected
in£ation
Output
gap Variable addition tests c Summary statistics
1983Q2^
1999Q2 a
5.776
(0.724)
1.144
(0.103)
ÿ0.392
(0.466)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
4.504
(0.038)
2.015
(0.161)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 56)
ARCH 4 F(4, 53)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 60)
0.942
1.381
2.14
0.741 [0.5964]
3.233 [0.0192]
4.257 [0.1190]
3.029 [0.0870]
1983Q2^
1999Q2 b
5.839
(0.83)
1.172
(0.119)
Output gap not
signi¢cant
Exchange rate:
0.239
(0.129)
Money
growth
Exchange
rate
2.554
(0.078)
9.959
(0.002)
R2
s
DW
AR 1^5 F(5, 55)
ARCH 4 F(4, 52)
Normality w22
RESET F(1, 59)
0.950
1.26
2.10
1.586 [0.1794]
5.289 [0.0012]
15.315 [0.0005]
4.077 [0.0480]
a Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, one-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
b Derived from an RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, two-quarter ahead expected in£ation, output gap and two lags of the dependent variable.
c Before estimating the second regression we tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth, lagged changes in the trade-weighted index of e¡ective exchange rate
were tested by an F version of the Wald test. p values in parentheses.
Asymptotic standard errors of estimated parameters are in parentheses. AR is a Lagrange multiplier test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH struc-
ture, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional misspeci¢cation. p values in square brackets.
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ä Conclusions
In this paper we estimate forward-looking interest rate reaction functions
for the G3 economies and for a group of countries which recently adopted
explicit in£ation targets and central bank reforms as the centrepiece of
their monetary strategies. In addition to the detailed results for each
country set out above, a number of general conclusions emerge from our
empirical results.
First, with the exception of the UK and New Zealand, the adoption
of in£ation targets does not by itself seem to have caused a major shift
in policy. In the case of New Zealand the shift was gradual post-1990. In
Canada it seems that any major changes in the responsiveness of interest
rates to expected in£ation took place well before the adoption of
in£ation targets. In most cases (New Zealand, Sweden, Canada) there is
little evidence that domestic interest rates react signi¢cantly to the
output gap. Although this still implies some degree of output
stabilization in response to aggregate demand shocks, it does re£ect a
lower priority on output stabilization following aggregate supply shocks.
Only time will tell if, after a period of reputation-building, monetary
policy will respond more vigorously to both in£ationary shocks and
output shocks. In the case of the UK the main policy shift seems to date
from 1992, with little change since 1997 in the behaviour of the Bank
of England.
Fig. 9 New Zealand, 1982Q4^1999Q2: Recursive Coe¤cients and Standard Error Bands;
One-step, N-step Up Chow tests (5 per cent)
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Second, in countries where there were explicit intermediate targets
(such as monetary aggregates in Germany) these were usually used as an
anchor for expectations, but this did not seem to strictly constrain policy
in practice. Monetary policy often followed a broader set of macro-
economic objectives. Our results con¢rm those of previous researchers
who ¢nd that in practice the Bundesbank targeted in£ation and output
and reacted to external conditions.
Third, where the policymaker is subject to some implicit constraint
due to external conditions (as in the case of Canada, Sweden, Japan and
New Zealand) this can sometimes lead to a less clear picture regarding the
monetary authorities' response to expected in£ation and to the cycle.
Interestingly even where the authorities abandon an exchange rate peg
(Sweden), external considerations still tend to matter. More generally, the
adoption of in£ation targets and the move to greater central bank
independence appear to have taken place without sacri¢cing these external
objectives.
Fourth, even in G3 countries where there have been no central bank
or other institutional reforms (e.g. the USA, Japan), we ¢nd that policies
did evolve to a considerable degree in the 1980s and 1990s. Only since the
1990s do these countries begin to resemble the Bundesbank in terms of
their estimated interest rate reaction functions. The variability of policy in
the USA until 1995 seems to have been linked to uncertainty about the
trend in potential output.
Fifth, with the exception of Germany and the UK (since 1992), most
of the monetary authorities in our sample do not seem to follow stable
simple forward-looking policy reaction functions based on output gaps
and expected in£ation (and, a fortiori, Taylor rules). This suggests that
caution has to be exercised in using an in£ation-targeting framework to
model the preferences of the monetary authorities (see Clarida et al., 1998;
Favero and Rovelli, 1999).
Finally, we should focus on some important di¡erences in the
behaviour of central banks regarding output stabilization. On the one
hand in the USA we seem to have the apparent `just do it' attitude of the
Fed, who since 1990 exploits her reputation to focus on the cycle, bolstered
to some extent by a shorter horizon on expected in£ation in the estimated
reaction function. At the other extreme there are those monetary
authorities who feel that they have yet to build up a reputation, e.g. the
apparently exclusive focus of the Bank of New Zealand on domestic
in£ation and exchange rate considerations. Whether this `reputation-
building' phase will also apply to central banks that have only recently
acquired their independence, such as the European Central Bank, remains
an open question. Interestingly, in the case of the Bank of England, output
stabilization does not appear to have been sacri¢ced with the adoption of
the in£ation target.
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Data Appendix
The data we used were quarterly series up to 1999Q2, extracted from OECD Main
Economic Indicators, apart from a few cases in which the source is equivalently
quoted. In most cases we were able to employ seasonally adjusted data.
For each country we measured output using the GDP at constant prices
series. For Sweden and New Zealand the available constant price series for GDP
do not date back further than 1980 and 1982Q2, respectively. The in£ation series
were de¢ned as simple four-quarter log-di¡erences in the all-items consumer price
index (CPI), except for Britain, where it was the equivalent change in the index
of retail prices excluding mortgage interest payments (not available before
1975).
The index of e¡ective exchange rates (trade weighted) was the measure for
the exchange rates. Also, spot exchange rates vis-a© -vis the US dollar were tried for
Japan, Germany, Canada, New Zealand and the UK; vis-a© -vis the German mark
for the UK and Sweden.
The rate on US Federal Funds was used as the foreign interest rate for Japan,
Germany, Canada and New Zealand. The three-month FIBOR German rate was
the foreign rate for the UK and Sweden.
Below we brie£y outline the short-term interest rates we chose as policy
indicators, along with the monetary aggregates we applied in the generation of
regressors. The rates are generally converted from monthly series.
Country Modelled interest rate variable Money
USA Federal Funds Rate. As noted in the main text, during the early
to mid-1980s the Federal Funds rate provides an accurate
measure of the Fed's policy stance. The only exception is the
Volcker experiment in the 1979^82 period, when the Fed's
operating procedures could be better summarized by a di¡erent
instrument choice (inter alia, Bernanke and Mihov, 1995;
Goodfriend, 1995)
M1
Japan The Call Money Rate (rate between ¢nancial institutions; source:
Bank of Japan) is directly a¡ected by the Bank of Japan reserve
management policy, through discount window and open market
operations
M2 plus
CD
Germany The Bundesbank's intentions are mainly re£ected by the rate in
the market for interbank reserves, the Call Money Rate. In fact,
the discount window lending to commercial banks exclusively
a¡ected the behaviour of this rate until 1985, when the banks
started to be supplied with reserves by repurchase operations.
Since then the call rate shadows the rate on these loans (repo
rate) (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1997; Clarida and Gertler,
1997)
M3a
UK We use an Overnight Interbank Rate series post-1983. This is not
available pre-1983, and we use the Rate on 90-day Treasury Bills,
which displays a very close correlation with the interbank lending
rate, for those observations (source: IMF, IFS)
M4
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